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Making Sense of the Minimum Wage
A Roadmap for Navigating Recent Research
By Jeffrey Clemens
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The new conventional wisdom holds that a large increase in the minimum wage would be desirable policy. Advocates for this policy dismiss the traditional concern that such an increase would lower employ-
ment for many of the low-skilled workers that the increase 
is intended to help. Recent economic research, they claim, 
demonstrates that the disemployment effects of increasing 
minimum wages are small or nonexistent, while there are 
large social benefits to raising the wage floor. 
This policy analysis discusses four ways in which the 
case for large minimum wage increases is either mistaken 
or overstated. 
First, the new conventional wisdom misreads the 
totality of recent evidence for the negative effects of 
minimum wages. Several strands of research arrive regu-
larly at the conclusion that high minimum wages reduce 
opportunities for disadvantaged individuals.
Second, the theoretical basis for minimum wage 
advocates’ claims is far more limited than they seem to 
realize. Advocates offer rationales for why current wage 
rates might be suppressed relative to their competitive 
market values. These arguments are reasonable to a point, 
but they are a weak basis for making claims about the ef-
fects of large minimum wage increases.
Third, economists’ empirical methods have blind 
spots. Notably, firms’ responses to minimum wage 
changes can occur in nuanced ways. I discuss why 
economists’ methods will predictably fail to capture 
firms’ responses in their totality.
Finally, the details of employees’ schedules, perks, 
fringe benefits, and the organization of the workplace 
are central to firms’ management of both their costs 
and productivity. Yet data on many aspects of workers’ 
relationships with their employers are incomplete, if not 
entirely lacking. Consequently, empirical evidence will 
tend to understate the minimum wage’s negative effects 
and overstate its benefits.
2“Though proponents 
of a higher 
wage can cite 
many papers 
to support 
their view, 
their reading 
of recent 
research is 
incomplete.”
INTRODUCTION
For decades, debates over the minimum 
wage have been tense among advocates, 
policy makers, and professional researchers 
alike. While professional economists were 
once broadly skeptical of the benefits of a min-
imum wage, that consensus has eroded.
Shifts in the views of media, advocates, 
policymakers, and researchers each have their 
own story. A striking example comes from the 
New York Times. In 1987, the Times editorial-
ized that “The Right Minimum Wage” is $0.1 
But in 2015, it opined that “fifteen dollars, 
phased in gradually . . . would be adequate and 
feasible.”2 Even more recently, it claimed that 
a living wage is an antidepressant. It is a 
sleep aid. A diet. A stress reliever. It is a 
contraceptive, preventing teenage preg-
nancy. It prevents premature death. It 
shields children from neglect.3 
In the eyes of the Times, the minimum wage 
has taken a 30-year journey from zero to hero. 
There is no ill, it seems, that a higher minimum 
wage cannot alleviate, if not outright cure.
Following decades of moderate minimum 
wage changes, select cities and states have re-
cently passed substantial increases. In Seattle, 
San Francisco, and New York City, the mini-
mum wage has already reached the milestone of 
$15. Recent laws passed by California, Illinois, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and 
New York call for statewide increases to $15 
in the coming years. Early in February of 2019, 
the U.S. House Committee on Education and 
Labor held a hearing to advance the agenda to 
take a $15 wage floor nationwide.4
An erosion of the consensus among aca-
demic economists predates this lurch in pub-
lic policy. Cracks in this consensus emerged 
in earnest when David Card and Alan 
Krueger wrote their book Myth and Measure-
ment: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage 
in the 1990s.5 Even so, a 2005 survey found 
that only 17 percent of economists favored 
increasing the federal minimum wage from 
the then floor of $5.15 per hour to $6.15.6 A 
more recent wave of research has coincided 
with a broader shift among academic econo-
mists. In 2013, nearly half the respondents to 
a survey by the University of Chicago agreed 
that a $9 federal minimum wage would be 
“desirable policy.”7 In 2015, only 26 percent 
of economists in a subsequent University of 
Chicago survey worried that a $15 minimum 
wage would significantly reduce employment 
for low-wage workers.8
Proponents of high minimum wages ar-
gue that their position is supported by the 
best evidence, giving them the scientific high 
ground. But does the research really justify 
this confidence and the accompanying shift 
in the conventional wisdom? Though pro-
ponents of a higher wage can cite many pa-
pers to support their view, their reading of 
recent research is incomplete. The research 
these proponents ignore has many strengths, 
including trans parent research methods, 
analyses of high-quality data, and a truly ran-
domized experiment. In contrast to the re-
search emphasized by advocates, the broader 
body of work regularly finds that increases in 
minimum wages cause job losses for individu-
als with low skill levels. 
Another problem with advocates’ calls 
for a much higher minimum wage is that the 
theoretical basis for their claims is far more 
limited than they seem to realize. Advocates 
offer rationales for why wage rates might be 
suppressed relative to competitive market 
values. These arguments are reasonable to a 
point, but they are a weak basis for making 
claims about the effects of large minimum 
wage increases.
Third, economists’ empirical methods have 
blind spots. Notably, firms’ responses to mini-
mum wage changes can occur with nuanced 
dynamics. I discuss why economists’ methods 
will predictably fail to capture such dynamics 
in their totality.
Finally, the details of employees’ schedules, 
perks, fringe benefits, and the organization of 
the workplace are central to firms’ management 
of both their costs and productivity. Yet data 
on many dimensions of workers’ relationships 
3“A great deal of recent 
research finds 
that minimum 
wage increases 
cause job 
losses among 
low-skilled 
population 
groups.”
with their employers are incomplete, if not 
entirely lacking. Consequently, empirical evi-
dence tends to understate the minimum wage’s 
negative effects and overstate its benefits.
WHAT CAN WE CONCLUDE 
FROM RECENT RESEARCH?
Media coverage of minimum wage changes 
provides a window into the minimum wage re-
search landscape. Changes in states’ minimum 
wage rates bring news stories on the wage gains 
workers will receive and the number of work-
ers who are ostensibly poised to receive them. 
As reported on December 27, 2018, in a head-
line from USA Today, “From California to New 
York, States Are Raising Minimum Wages in 
2019 for 17 Million Workers.”9 The article does 
not consider that some of those workers may 
lose employment under the higher wage. It 
does not mention how employers might offset 
the minimum wage’s effects on their costs or 
how such changes might affect workers’ lives.
Where do the authors of such articles turn 
for their facts? The USA Today article draws on 
calculations by the National Employment Law 
Project (NELP). Similar articles from CBS, 
NPR, and other news outlets draw on calcu-
lations from the Economic Policy Institute 
(EPI).10 In turn, these organizations cite aca-
demic research to support their views. 
Minimum wage analyses from NELP 
and EPI draw on research papers that have 
challenged the traditional view that mini-
mum wage increases reduce employment. 
Key research in this vein includes a 2010 pa-
per by Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester, 
and Michael Reich;11 a 2011 paper by Sylvia 
Allegretto, Dube, and Reich;12 a 2017 paper by 
Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Ben Zipperer;13 
and a 2019 paper by Doruk Cengiz, Dube, 
Attila Lindner, and Zipperer.14 Each of those 
papers analyzes a large set of minimum wage 
changes enacted by U.S. states or the federal 
government that spans several decades. In ev-
ery case, the authors conclude that there is no 
evidence to support the view that minimum 
wage increases cause job losses. In a recent 
piece of congressional testimony, Reich used 
this research to argue that minimum wage 
increases up to $15 have “no negative employ-
ment effects.”15 
In addition to influencing policy discus-
sions, the papers previously referenced have 
been influential within the professional re-
search community. Importantly, these studies 
are not extreme outliers. A 2016 analysis by 
Paul Wolfson and Dale Belman found that the 
estimated effects of minimum wage increases 
on employment have been, on average, quite 
small in recent studies.16
At the same time, a great deal of recent 
research finds that minimum wage increases 
cause job losses among low-skilled popula-
tion groups. In the remainder of this section, 
I discuss four strands of research that fit this 
description. In the first, a number of papers 
use the same data to study the same minimum 
wage changes as the papers referenced previ-
ously, but arrive at different conclusions. The 
second strand of research analyzes more com-
pactly defined episodes of minimum wage in-
creases within the recent experience of U.S. 
cities and states. A third strand analyzes mini-
mum wage changes using high-quality admin-
istrative data from Europe. Finally, I discuss a 
paper that analyzes a truly randomized experi-
ment involving the imposition of minimum 
wages in an online labor market.
Research on the Long History of 
U.S. Minimum Wage Changes
The research most often discussed by U.S. 
media analyzes over three decades of U.S. 
state and federal minimum wage changes. In 
what follows, I focus on the substantive is-
sues at stake in the debate within this strand 
of research. Readers interested in references 
to key entries in this debate can find a road-
map in the endnotes.17 
Researchers estimate the effects of mini-
mum wage changes by making comparisons 
between states that increased their minimum 
wages and states that did not. The goal is to 
infer whether an increase in minimum wages 
led to the number of jobs changing differently 
4“The debate is difficult 
to evaluate 
because key 
differences 
between 
competing 
studies are 
opaque.”
than it otherwise would have. The key ques-
tion for evaluating the quality of these analy-
ses is whether the states being compared are 
“good counterfactuals.” That is, do the states 
being compared reliably allow us to infer how 
employment would have changed if states had 
not increased their minimum wages? Debates 
between researchers are in large part debates 
over which approaches to selecting com-
parisons generate “good counterfactuals” and 
hence “unbiased estimates.”
In their 2008 book Minimum Wages, David 
Neumark and William Wascher summarized 
existing research as being broadly support-
ive of the view that minimum wages ad-
versely affect low-skilled workers.18 Card and 
Krueger’s work notwithstanding, Neumark 
and Wascher argued that the weight of the ev-
idence implied that minimum wage increases 
reduce employment. In their own empirical 
research, Neumark and Wascher have relied 
on the broadest possible set of comparisons 
between states that increased minimum wag-
es and states that did not. In contrast, papers 
finding that minimum wage changes have no 
effect on employment typically rely on sub-
sets of the available comparisons. Because 
their comparisons are less selected, Neumark 
and Wascher’s analyses are less prone to 
charges of data mining. This makes their ap-
proach the natural default unless there is a 
compelling case that their method would re-
sult in systematically biased estimates. Crit-
ics of their research argue that such biases 
do exist and are so severe that Neumark and 
Wascher’s estimates are not “credible.”
The claim that a scholarly work lacks cred-
ibility is a strong one, but does the strength of 
the evidence match the strength of the claim? 
The answer is no, because there is remarkably 
little fire behind the smoke. To date, direct 
evidence for the strengths and weaknesses of 
alternative research methods is in surprisingly 
short supply. In their own terminology, the 
biases alleged by Dube, Lester, and Reich are 
“unobserved.” That is, their argument is not 
built on evidence of specific economic forces 
that, in their telling, give rise to systematic 
biases. If anything, states appear to enact min-
imum wage increases when their labor mar-
kets are expanding more rapidly than the labor 
markets in other states. This will tend to bias 
analyses toward finding that minimum wage 
increases have a positive effect on employ-
ment, which is the opposite of what Neumark 
and Wascher’s critics allege.
As Neumark observes in a 2018 review 
of recent research, papers using a variety of 
best-practice methodologies have concluded 
that minimum wage increases reduce em-
ployment.19 Indeed, several recent papers 
use methods that are designed to account 
for precisely the kind of unobserved forces 
that Dube, Lester, and Reich claim bias tradi-
tional minimum wage research. Two examples 
that analyze roughly the same history of U.S. 
minimum wage changes include a 2017 paper 
by David Powell and a 2012 paper by Yusuf 
Baskaya and Yona Rubinstein.20 Both papers 
estimate substantial negative effects of mini-
mum wage increases on teen employment, 
echoing the traditional research finding. 
In summary, the segment of the minimum 
wage literature that simultaneously analyzes 
three decades of minimum wage changes re-
mains contentious. Relative to Neumark and 
Wascher’s early estimation frameworks, some 
methodologies for accounting for nuanced bi-
ases yield smaller estimates, while others yield 
larger estimates. Because direct evidence in 
favor of one approach and against others is in 
short supply, strong conclusions based on this 
strand of research alone are unwarranted. 
Research on Recent U.S. 
Minimum Wage Changes
The debate described above is difficult 
to evaluate because key differences between 
competing studies are opaque. The studies in 
question attempt to analyze hundreds of dis-
tinct events simultaneously. An advantage of 
this approach is that it may provide evidence 
for the average effect of minimum wage in-
creases across a broad range of settings. But 
when estimates are in dispute, a drawback of 
such an analysis is that it becomes difficult to 
5“The University of 
Washington 
research 
team found 
evidence that 
hours worked 
by low-wage 
employees 
declined 
substantially 
in the wake 
of the series 
of minimum 
wage 
increases.”
determine why competing studies of the same 
events arrive at different conclusions. 
A number of recent studies take an alterna-
tive approach: they analyze compact historical 
episodes in isolation. The key benefit of this 
approach is that differences between studies 
can be transparently debated with reference 
to the events surrounding a single historical 
episode. Transparency of this sort is crucial for 
evaluating competing studies. For this reason, 
the approach of focusing on compact histori-
cal episodes is standard practice in other areas 
of economic research, including analyses of 
major health and tax policy reforms. 
My own work on the minimum wage has 
separately considered two distinct historical 
episodes. In a recently published work, Michael 
Wither and I estimate the effects of the federal 
minimum wage changes enacted during the 
Great Recession.21 The 2007–2009 federal in-
creases had greater effects in some states than 
others, depending on the initial level of a state’s 
minimum wage. We use data that follow indi-
viduals over time, which allows us to separate 
minimum wage workers from workers with 
moderately higher skills. We find that employ-
ment among minimum wage workers declined 
far more in states that were “fully bound” by the 
federal minimum wage changes than in states 
that were not. Notably, employment among 
moderately higher-skilled individuals does not 
exhibit this pattern; changes in the employ-
ment of these workers were comparable be-
tween the two groups of states. This bolsters 
the case that our analysis is not biased by differ-
ences in the severity of states’ underlying reces-
sions. Indeed, housing market indicators reveal 
that our estimates are more likely to be biased 
toward finding positive effects of minimum 
wage increases than negative effects. We esti-
mate that the federal minimum wage increases 
enacted during the Great Recession reduced 
employment among low-skilled individuals by 
hundreds of thousands of jobs.
Like other minimum wage research that 
has drawn public attention, our work has its 
detractors. Zipperer replicated the findings 
Wither and I reported in an earlier version of 
our paper, but he contested our interpretation 
and conclusions.22 Wither and I responded to 
Zipperer’s critiques with a series of additional 
analyses.23 We leave interested readers to di-
gest the details of this debate by reading the 
studies themselves.
A number of papers have analyzed state 
and local minimum wage changes enacted in 
recent years. In a widely discussed study by re-
searchers at the University of Washington, ad-
ministrative records from Washington State’s 
unemployment insurance system were used to 
analyze the effects of a recent series of increas-
es in Seattle’s minimum wage.24 The research 
team found evidence that hours worked by 
low-wage employees declined substantially in 
the wake of the series of increases. Indeed, the 
decrease for all these workers together was 
so large that their overall earnings declined 
slightly. Subsequent work by the Seattle team 
found evidence that employment fell only a lit-
tle, if at all, for workers with prior experience 
in low-wage jobs.25 This suggests that employ-
ment declined primarily because of reductions 
in hiring rather than increases in firing.
At this point, readers may be unsurprised to 
learn that the conclusions of the Seattle mini-
mum wage study are in dispute. Most notably, 
the study’s initial findings were contested in a 
memo from Reich to the office of Seattle may-
or Ed Murray.26 This memo was complement-
ed by critical analyses by Zipperer and John 
Schmitt, which were disseminated through 
the EPI.27 In revisions to their analyses, the 
Seattle team has responded to several of the 
initial criticisms leveled against their work. Al-
though they have only modestly revised their 
original conclusions, it is unclear what econo-
mists’ final verdict on this episode will be.
Many U.S. states have enacted substan-
tial minimum wage changes in recent years. 
The early phases of these changes have been 
analyzed in a 2017 paper by Radha Gopalan, 
Barton Hamilton, Ankit Kalda, and David 
Sovich.28 These authors analyze administra-
tive employment records from Equifax, which 
allow them to track roughly one million hourly 
wage workers. Using data from 2011 through 
6“The largest of states’ 
minimum 
wage increases 
are negatively 
associated 
with 
employment 
among those 
in low-skilled 
groups.”
2015, they find that establishments that em-
ploy low-wage workers reduced employment 
following minimum wage increases. This oc-
curred through reductions in hiring rather 
than layoffs of existing low-wage workers, 
which is consistent with the findings of the 
Seattle minimum wage study.
In additional research, Michael Strain and 
I are analyzing recent minimum wage changes 
using precommitted research designs.29 That 
is, to avoid the pitfalls of data mining, we are 
reporting the results of analyses to which we 
committed after analyzing data that extended 
through 2015. Thus far, our estimates sug-
gest that the effects of recent minimum wage 
changes have been highly varied. The largest of 
states’ minimum wage increases are negatively 
associated with employment among those in 
low-skilled groups. Further, the employment 
declines associated with large minimum wage 
changes have grown in magnitude as we have 
incorporated data from 2016, 2017, and 2018 
into our analyses. In contrast, small changes 
have had modest and possibly positive rela-
tionships with employment.
Recent evidence points to important 
roles for subtle yet conventional labor mar-
ket forces. That is, the evidence suggests that 
the dynamics of labor demand are crucial for 
understanding the minimum wage’s effects. 
During the Great Recession, for example, a 
combination of low demand and substantial 
churn may have set the stage for the rela-
tively sharp effects of the 2007–2009 federal 
minimum wage increases on employment. In 
contrast, it may be the case that only large min-
imum wage changes have large enough effects 
on firms’ costs to alter their hiring during an 
economic expansion. When labor markets are 
tight, firms may effectively ignore small mini-
mum wage increases, enabling such increases 
to have their intended effects on wages. 
Research from European Contexts
A number of recent papers have analyzed 
minimum wage changes using high-quality 
administrative data from European countries. 
Recent country-specific analyses examine 
Denmark, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Germany. While estimates vary 
substantially among these analyses, each case 
provides evidence that firms respond in tradi-
tional ways to increases in labor costs.
Claus Kreiner, Daniel Reck, and Peer Skov 
use Danish administrative data from 2012 to 
2015 to analyze the employment effects of an 
age-specific increase in the minimum wage.30 
They find that the higher wage floor appli-
cable to 18-year-olds substantially reduces 
their employment compared to 17-year-olds, 
for whom the wage floor is much lower. The 
employment drop is large enough to ensure 
that the total earnings of 18-year-olds are no 
greater than the total earnings of 17-year-olds, 
despite their higher wage floor.
Constantine Yannelis uses administrative 
employment records to analyze reductions in 
Greece’s minimum wage rates.31 The minimum 
wage changes he analyzes were implement-
ed in 2012 in accordance with International 
Monetary Fund bailout terms. These wage 
reductions were disproportionately large 
for young workers relative to older workers. 
Yannelis finds that these changes led firms to 
significantly increase their employment of 
young workers relative to older workers.
Peter Harasztosi and Attila Lindner analyze 
a large national minimum wage increase enact-
ed by Hungary.32 They use firms’ administrative 
tax filings to classify the extent to which each 
firm was affected and to track changes in firms’ 
employment over time. Harasztosi and Lindner 
conclude that roughly 1 in 10 workers affected 
by Hungary’s dramatic minimum wage increase 
lost employment. Because the wage increase 
was quite large, the wage bills of strongly affect-
ed firms increased substantially. In this setting, 
the authors find that the bulk of the minimum 
wage increase’s costs were borne by consumers 
through increases in prices.
Jan Kabatek looks at the Netherlands.33 
Like Denmark, this is a case of minimum 
wage rates that rise significantly with age. 
Using data that track individuals over time, 
Kabatek concludes that workers become sub-
stantially more likely to lose their jobs in the 
7“In Horton’s randomized 
experiment, 
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minimum 
wage rates 
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who are less 
productive.”
two months prior to birthdays on which their 
minimum wage rises. He finds that these in-
dividuals gradually return to employment 
over subsequent months.
Emmanuel Saez, Benjamin Schoefer, and 
David Seim analyze Swedish payroll tax reduc-
tions implemented between 2007 and 2009.34 
These tax changes were meant to reduce the 
cost of young workers to firms. From the per-
spective of firms, the tax changes were eco-
nomically similar to a reduction in negotiated 
wage rates. Using Swedish administrative re-
cords, which are renowned for their high qual-
ity, the authors found that these tax changes 
led to substantial increases in the employment 
of younger workers relative to older workers. 
Finally, Marco Caliendo, Carsten Schröder, 
and Linda Wittbrodt summarize research, 
including their own work with Alexandra 
Fedorets and Malte Preuss, on the 2015 in-
troduction of Germany’s statutory minimum 
wage.35 The German experience was novel 
because it involved a shift from collectively 
bargained wages to a statutory minimum 
wage floor, as opposed to an increase in an 
existing minimum wage. These authors con-
clude that the introduction of the minimum 
wage caused a small reduction in the number 
of low-wage jobs. Consistent with work on 
recent U.S. minimum wage changes, employ-
ment declines have come primarily through 
reductions in hiring rather than increases in 
firing. Among those individuals with jobs, re-
ductions in hours were large enough to ensure 
that the monthly incomes of low-wage work-
ers changed little. 
An Actual Experiment
A final piece of research that deserves 
emphasis is a 2018 paper by John Horton.36 
He analyzes an online labor market in which 
firms contract with workers for tasks includ-
ing programming, data entry, and graphic de-
sign. In contrast with the papers discussed 
thus far, Horton identified an opportunity to 
deploy a randomized controlled trial to study 
the effects of minimum wage increases. As 
the designer of the study, he could impose 
differences in firms’ minimum wage require-
ments through random assignment. He finds 
that firms make significant shifts in the work-
ers they employ when they are required to pay 
higher wages. In other words, they shift away 
from workers who are the least skilled and 
toward workers who demonstrate higher pro-
ductivity on past jobs. High minimum wage 
rates thus reduce the employment opportuni-
ties of workers who are less productive.
DOES THE EVIDENCE 
JUSTIFY THE SHIFT IN THE 
TRADITIONAL CONSENSUS?
Why has the consensus on minimum wages 
shifted? This is a difficult question, and any an-
swer is necessarily speculative. In this section 
I discuss several issues that arguably are under-
appreciated by the new conventional wisdom.
Mistake 1: An Incomplete Reading 
of the Recent Research
The new conventional wisdom has to an 
unwarranted degree focused on the debate 
over the long history of minimum wage chang-
es in the United States—that is, it has focused 
on the research discussed at the beginning of 
the previous section of this paper. It has fo-
cused less on other lines of research. In par-
ticular, it has focused less on recent research 
from European contexts, including Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, 
and Sweden, as well as on research that trans-
parently analyzes compact historical episodes 
in the U.S. experience.
The emphasis of the new conventional 
wisdom is unfortunate because other lines of 
research have desirable features. In research 
on the effects of taxes, unemployment ben-
efits, and other public policy initiatives, three 
attributes of studies have, with good reason, 
emerged as attributes toward which research-
ers strive. The first is a preference for data from 
individual-level administrative records over 
both aggregate data and survey data. The sec-
ond is a preference for running experiments 
whenever possible. The third is an emphasis on 
8“Both data and intuition 
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implementing transparent research methods.
The research that forms the basis of the 
new conventional wisdom tends to lack all 
three of these attributes. Even when these 
studies’ methods appear transparent and in-
tuitive, opaque choices tend to determine 
both the sets of events that are studied and 
the comparisons underlying the estimates. 
In contrast, the research with which many 
audiences are less familiar includes truly ran-
domized experiments and makes regular use 
of transparent methods and individual-level 
administrative records.
Mistake 2: Shortcomings in the 
Application of Economic Thinking
In addition to taking a narrow view of the 
recent literature, the shifting consensus on 
the minimum wage has roots in several short-
comings in the application of basic economic 
ideas to real-world markets. The first involves 
discussions of labor market imperfections. 
The second involves the fact that there is more 
to a job than its wage. The third involves the 
time horizons over which firms can respond to 
changes in policy.
CONCEPTIONS OF PERFECT COMPETITION VS. 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION. In economic theory, 
the minimum wage’s effects depend on how 
wages are set within labor markets. If a market 
is perfectly competitive, then pay aligns 
perfectly with a worker’s productivity. Under 
perfect competition, a binding minimum 
wage is by definition a wage that exceeds some 
workers’ productivity. In this framework, a 
binding minimum wage will inevitably cause 
some workers to be laid off by firms.
Contrast that with models of markets 
with imperfect competition. The key feature 
of these models is that market wages are sup-
pressed relative to their perfectly competitive 
levels—that is, workers are paid less than the 
value of what they produce. Consequently, in 
these models it is possible for a minimum wage 
increase to improve workers’ earnings without 
excluding them from employment. Firms are 
willing to pay a minimum wage that exceeds 
what they would otherwise have paid as long as 
that wage does not exceed a given worker’s pro-
ductivity. In discussions of such models, “mon-
opsony” and “frictions” are the jargon with 
which readers may be increasingly familiar.
The first chapter of Alan Manning’s influ-
ential 2003 book Monopsony in Motion begins 
with the following thought experiment: What 
happens if an employer cuts the wage they pay 
their workers by one cent?37 Because a penny is 
very small, the answer to this question is noth-
ing. From this thought experiment, Manning 
concludes that “it is monopsony, not perfect 
competition, that is the best simple model to 
describe the decision problem facing an indi-
vidual employer.”38 This shift in framing is of 
great consequence. The textbook mono psony 
model is one in which a modest minimum 
wage can actually increase employment among 
low-skilled workers. It is a model in which the 
minimum wage can be used to combat ineffi-
ciencies linked to employer market power.
But the transition from the one-penny 
thought experiment to a monopsony-centric 
view of the labor market merits scrutiny. A 
model’s importance stems from the power of 
its broad predictive and explanatory content, 
not from an illusory to-the-penny precision. 
Whether a competitive or monopsony-centric 
model is more useful depends on key details of 
both the labor market and the policy changes 
one is attempting to understand. 
The practical implications of Manning’s 
thought experiment hinge on the size of the 
frictions that give firms market power. Work-
ers do not leave their employers over pennies; 
it costs more than pennies to find a new job. 
It is the cost of finding a new job that deter-
mines the power held by a worker’s employer 
to set wages. 
Both data and intuition suggest that em-
ployers wield only modest market power over 
low-skilled workers. One need only enter a 
mall, with its food court and retail outlets, to 
appreciate the large number of employers to 
which most low-wage workers can potentially 
apply. Real-world data concur; the value of the 
time it would take most minimum wage work-
ers to find a competitive job offer is unlikely 
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to exceed $1,000–$2,000.39 For full-time 
workers, these amounts are equivalent to 
$0.50–$1.00 in hourly pay. A wage differential 
of $1 is thus far more likely to lead workers to 
seek new jobs than the penny from Manning’s 
thought experiment.
Real-world search costs appear to have quite 
modest implications for the market power 
employers can exert over workers in low-wage 
industries, such as food service and retail sales. 
The facts suggest that the monopsony frame-
work may be useful for analyzing modest mini-
mum wage increases from modest initial levels. 
But for large minimum wage changes, a model 
approaching the benchmark of perfect compe-
tition should be the more reliable guide.
FRINGE BENEFITS AND OTHER ATTRIBUTES 
OF JOBS. Many analyses of the minimum wage 
adopt a narrow view of relationships between 
workers and employers. Specifically, they 
simplify the relationship to two factors: wages 
and employment. In analyses of this sort, the 
minimum wage’s effect on a worker’s well-being 
is deceptively simple. If the wage rises and the 
worker remains employed, naïve models imply 
that the worker is necessarily better off.
But in practice, when we negotiate with 
our employers, we appreciate that jobs have 
many subtle but important characteristics. 
Work hours can be at the convenience of 
the worker or at the convenience of the firm. 
The pace of work can be fast or slow, safer or 
riskier, and can require more or less mental 
energy. Compensation can either include or 
exclude health insurance, retirement contri-
butions, and other benefits. A job’s location 
can be more or less preferable, and opportu-
nities for advancement (within or outside the 
firm) can be more or less ample.
All these factors affect both workers’ well-
being and firms’ bottom lines. Most minimum 
wage commentary sweeps these factors under 
the rug, but nuanced models recognize that 
they are central for understanding the mini-
mum wage’s effects. Adjustments to nonwage 
factors are among the most obvious and in-
expensive adjustments a firm can make. Re-
ducing noncash compensation and requiring 
increases in a worker’s effort are straight-
forward ways for employers to align costs and 
revenues following minimum wage increases. 
Crucially, actions along these margins will 
tend to offset any wage increase’s effects on 
a worker’s well-being. Because these factors 
are often unmeasured, our awareness of their 
importance makes it appropriate to embrace 
humility regarding the strength of the conclu-
sions we can draw from available data. 
Economists have long been aware that a 
job’s nonwage characteristics can be central 
to its value to workers. In a 1986 chapter from 
the Handbook of Labor Economics, Sherwin 
Rosen observes that the framework of “com-
pensating wage differentials” has been with 
the economics profession since Adam Smith’s 
The Wealth of Nations.40 There has recently 
been a wave of high-quality research on this 
theme. Several recent papers highlight the 
value of worker-driven schedules.41 One paper 
by Nicole Maestas, Kathleen Mullen, David 
Powell, and others finds that workers are will-
ing to pay substantially for improvements 
in workplace conditions.42 Complementary 
research by Isaac Sorkin finds that nonwage 
aspects of jobs account for a large fraction of 
total variation in workers’ valuations of jobs 
among different firms.43
Despite the obvious importance of non-
wage factors, research on the extent to which 
these factors are affected by minimum wage 
increases is quite limited. Because of data limi-
tations, the primary nonwage factor that can 
be incorporated into minimum wage studies 
is whether workers have employer-provided 
health insurance (EPHI). Analyses of histori-
cal minimum wage changes tend to find weak 
evidence of a relationship between minimum 
wage increases and EPHI. In contrast, analy-
ses of more recent minimum wage changes 
tend to find negative effects.44 On a qualita-
tively different but important margin, papers 
by Hyejin Ku and by Decio Coviello, Erika 
Deserranno, and Nicola Persico find that low-
productivity workers increase their work ef-
fort in the wake of minimum wage increases.45 
But little if any evidence exists on a rich set of 
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potentially important margins, including the 
flexibility of work schedules.
DYNAMICS. When estimating the effects of 
minimum wage increases, economists struggle 
to capture subtleties in the timing with which 
firms might respond. An example involving the 
payment-processing technologies in which fast-
food chains can invest illustrates several points. 
Fast-food chains can choose either 
employee-operated cash registers or auto-
mated kiosks. An important aspect of this 
choice is that it involves upfront investments 
in equipment that may depreciate gradually 
over many years. For new firms, high mini-
mum wages may tip the cost calculation in fa-
vor of automated kiosks. New entrants to the 
fast-food market may thus adopt less labor-
intensive business models soon after high min-
imum wages go into effect. But for continuing 
firms, the calculation may be quite different. 
This will be particularly true for those that 
made investments in standard cash registers 
prior to a minimum wage increase’s passage. If 
the minimum wage rises modestly, such firms 
may continue operating with cash registers 
until their equipment requires replacement. 
Consequently, their response to a minimum 
wage increase might not occur until years af-
ter the change has gone into effect. This dif-
ference between new entrants and continuing 
firms highlights that a minimum wage change’s 
overall effects may unfold gradually.
Economists have little evidence on how 
firms adjust their capital investments in re-
sponse to changes in minimum wages. Efforts 
to study firms’ production technologies have 
to date been indirect. For example, recent 
studies by Dan Aaronson and Brian Phelan 
and by Grace Lordon and David Neumark find 
that minimum wage increases predict declines 
in employment among workers in occupations 
whose tasks are readily replaced with technol-
ogy.46 Related analyses emphasize the produc-
tivity of the workers within each occupation. 
In his randomized experiment in an online 
labor market, John Horton finds evidence 
that firms shift from lower-productivity work-
ers toward higher-productivity workers. Lisa 
Kahn, Jonathan Meer, and I similarly find that 
recent increases in states’ minimum wages 
predict increases in the average age and edu-
cation of workers in low-wage occupations.47
Minimum wage changes often come with 
long lags between the dates when they are 
legislated and the dates when they are imple-
mented. In an analysis of recent legislative 
histories, Duncan Hobbs, Michael Strain, and 
I find that recent state-initiated minimum 
wage increases had lags averaging six months 
between the date of their passage and the date 
a first increase was implemented.48 Lags be-
tween the date of legislation and the final date 
of multistep increases are much longer. 
Empirical methods in the minimum wage 
literature account poorly for lags between leg-
islative activity and implementation. When an 
increase is signed into law, forward-thinking 
firms know to take cost implications into ac-
count. Some firms may thus change their tech-
nologies before a minimum wage increase goes 
into effect. Firms’ forward-looking responses 
undermine the ways many economists deploy 
statistical tests to estimate a minimum wage 
change’s effects. When estimating those ef-
fects, economists worry that their estimates 
will be biased if the labor markets in states that 
enact minimum wage increases were trend-
ing differently than the labor markets in other 
states. Unfortunately, these differential trends 
cannot easily be distinguished from forward-
looking responses of firms. The standard prac-
tice in recent research has been to lump these 
phenomena together—that is, forward-looking 
responses have been conflated with “divergent 
pre-existing trends.” In turn, they are assumed 
to be evidence that estimates are likely to be bi-
ased. Standard practice thus biases researchers 
against detecting negative effects of minimum 
wage increases on employment.
Although this bias remains pervasive in 
recent minimum wage research, its relevance 
has been recognized for quite some time. 
The implications of investments by forward-
looking firms were developed in papers by 
Sorkin and by Aaronson, Eric French, Sorkin, 
and Ted To.49 A key empirical aspect of these 
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insights was highlighted in work by Jonathan 
Meer and Jeremy West,50 who show that com-
mon techniques for accounting for “divergent 
trends” may in fact bias analyses toward incor-
rectly concluding that minimum wages have 
no effect on employment. These authors show 
that in some cases this bias can be resolved 
by analyzing employment growth rather than 
employment levels. Although Cengiz, Dube, 
Lindner, and Zipperer have recently criticized 
the empirical analysis of Meer and West, the 
theoretical thread connecting the analyses of 
Meer and West to those of Aaronson, French, 
Sorkin, and To is unchallenged. The key con-
ceptual point is strongly intuitive and appears 
to be well founded.
CONCLUSION: WHERE DO 
WE GO FROM HERE?
The “Fight for $15” has shifted from the 
advocacy fringes to the political mainstream. 
News media increasingly report that a $15 fed-
eral minimum wage would benefit low-skilled 
workers at little cost. This essay pushes against 
that shift on several grounds: the new conven-
tional wisdom’s reading of recent evidence 
is incomplete, its grounding in theory is far 
more limited than its supporters let on, and it 
ignores significant blind spots in economists’ 
empirical methods. 
Because $15 wage floors have been narrowly 
and only recently applied, there is no evidence 
to support the sweeping claim that a $15 federal 
minimum wage would benefit disadvantaged 
households at little cost. This is particularly 
true when we consider regions where low hous-
ing and labor costs support the social and labor 
market integration of both immigrants and 
low-skilled native-born workers. More than 
doubling the minimum wage, from $7.25 to 
$15.00, risks radically altering the entry-level 
opportunities on which these individuals rely.
Recent minimum wage changes have been 
substantial, with scheduled increases ap-
proaching 70 percent of the initial minimum 
wage in several states. Large differences in 
states’ minimum wage policies have now been 
sustained for several years. Recent experience 
may thus provide the best opportunity in de-
cades to learn about the medium-run effects 
of substantial minimum wage changes. As data 
on recent labor market developments pour in, 
the next several years will be an exciting time 
for both minimum wage research and mini-
mum wage researchers.
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